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Designing Effective Parliamentary Inquiries:  Lessons 
Learned from the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry 
 
Abstract 
Ireland’s Oireachtas inquiry mechanisms are generally regarded as having been hamstrung by 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Ardagh v Maguire. This perception of a “legal 
straightjacket” has been heightened by the public’s reluctance to entrust politicians with 
investigative powers, as embodied in the loss of the thirtieth amendment vote. In this article, 
however, we argue that a marginalised or weak parliamentary inquiry mechanism is not an 
inevitable consequence of the Ardagh decision. We analyse the manner in which the Houses of 
the Oireachtas (Inquiries, Privileges and Procedures) Act 2013 has produced a self-imposed 
restrictive inquiry structure oversensitive to possible litigation. Reflecting on the operation of 
the Banking Inquiry, we trace how inquiry design is unduly shaped by the “chilling effects” of 
litigation rather than other variables. We argue that the Banking Inquiry experience stands as 
an object lesson as to the importance of developing clear terms of reference which match the 
qualities of parliamentary investigation to an appropriate subject matter.  Overall, this article 
highlights that, for the Irish constitutional order, greater engagement is needed with the full 




The role of Parliament has been termed the “least examined” branch of the 
constitutional separation of powers,1 with parliamentary inquiries often constituting 
one of the least probed areas of constitutional frameworks. The past decade, has 
however, seen the Irish Courts and the general public confront the core issues of 
whether parliamentary inquiries can escape a narrow party political focus or embed fair 
procedures into their investigations. The Irish public underlined their mistrust in 
politicians as investigators, by rejecting the recent proposed constitutional amendment 
to strengthen the Oireachtas’ inquiry powers. The reaction of government was to create 
a new legislative framework, the Houses of the Oireachtas (Inquiries, Privileges and 
Procedures) Act 2013, which sought to refocus the mechanism. Nevertheless, the 
completion of the first inquiry to be held under this new framework, the high profile 
Oireachtas Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis (Banking Inquiry), saw 
some Committee members argue that no further inquiries should held under the 2013 
Act.2 The current government indicated that the “limited and constrained” experience 
                                                           
1 See Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana (eds.), The Least Examined Branch – The Role of 
Legislatures in the Constitutional State, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
2 See comments by Joe Higgins T.D. and Senator Marc MacSharry. Sarah Bardon, ‘Finalised Bank 
Report calls for action against ECB’, Irish Times, (Dublin, December 7 2015). 
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may mean a further referendum on inquiries is necessary.3 While such interventions 
carry with them an implication that the Supreme Court, in Ardagh v Maguire4 has 
effectively outlawed strong parliamentary inquiries, in this article we argue that this 
was not the inevitable outcome. The threads of law, administration and politics 
underpinning the operation of parliamentary inquiries can be difficult to untangle and 
the easy allegation that parliamentary investigations are unavoidably sclerotic exercises 
encrusted by legalism should be avoided. 
  
The current challenges facing parliamentary inquiries should be understood as 
reflecting a broader failure of legislative constitutionalism, rather than as a product of 
judicial rulings alone. While Irish debates regarding the separation of powers have often 
focused upon allegations of judicial activism, a key variable contributing to juricentric 
constitutionalism is often legislative passivity, where legislative action which is core to 
the proper expression and delivery of constitutional values is not taken. We argue that 
the reaction to the 2002 Supreme Court ruling of Ardagh reveals worrying trends in the 
quality of constitutional deliberation in the Oireachtas. As has been argued in the United 
States context, the separation of powers requires “the constant, creative interplay 
between the judiciary and the political system” where Parliament acts as a stimulus to 
constitutional innovation and thinking.5 This branch of constitutional law scholarship 
stresses the obligation of each branch of government to interpret the Constitution in 
pursuing its actions. The struggles of the Oireachtas to reflect upon and integrate the 
Ardagh ruling into its oversight functions illustrates the damaging impacts of a 
legislature which is overly sensitive to the “chilling effects” of litigation. Where such 
legal proofing becomes the primary stimulus on constitutional deliberation in the 
Oireachtas, the legislative branch is reduced to: 
 “…an echo of the courts, not an alternative center of legislative 
constitutionalism…not so much interested in getting the Constitution right as in 
                                                           
3 Comment of Taoiseach Enda Kenny, Eoin Burke-Kennedy, ‘Kenny hints at re-run of Oireachtas 
Inquiries referendum’, Irish Times. (Dublin, January 28 2016). 
4 [2002] 1 IR 447. Hereinafter Ardagh. 
5 Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process, (Princeton University 
Press, 1988), at 4. 
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anticipating what the judges will do. When it comes to constitutional law, legislators 
are Oliver Wendell Holmes's paradigmatic "bad man.”6 
The analysis which follows thus seeks to highlight the importance of what West has 
termed “the legislated Constitution”; the parliamentary action which should accompany 
the adjudicated Constitution.7 
 
We thus restart and broaden the conversation concerning parliamentary inquiries in the 
aftermath of the failed referendum. The challenges facing inquiry committees are not 
solely attributable to legal restrictions but also reflect an overarching failure to carve 
out a clear identity for the mechanism, the unfortunate design of the 2013 Act and the 
political dynamics surrounding the creation of terms of reference. While the 
parliamentary inquiry represents an imperfect oversight mechanism, often providing 
only an incomplete lens on governmental failures, we argue that it should remain a 
cornerstone of the inquiries landscape. Recent scholarship also points to the continuing 
impact of investigatory parliamentary committees, distinct from other activities such as 
legislative drafting.8 Though recent years have seen increased reliance upon the 
independent public inquiry, this also suffers from deficiencies, and remains 
fundamentally reliant upon a supportive political culture.9 We argue that for the Irish 
constitutional order, greater engagement is needed with the variables which shape the 
creation, operation and effectiveness of parliamentary review. Our starting point must 
be to ask: to what extent did the Banking Inquiry produce a positive self-conception of 
the modern parliamentary inquiry? 
 
The Poor Functioning of Parliamentary Oversight Prior to the Economic Crash 
In the Irish context, the parliamentary inquiry has suffered from a lack of public 
confidence, with it being viewed as shaped by party political factors rather than an 
                                                           
6 Keith E Whitttington, ‘James Madison Has Left the Building’, 75(3) (2005) University of Chicago Law 
Review, 1155. Quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’, 10 (1897) Harv L Rev 457, 460-
61: 
“What constitutes the law? You will find some text writers telling you that it is something different 
from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or England .... But if we take the view of our 
friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but 
that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact.” 
7 Robin West, ‘Toward a Study of the Legislated Constitution’, 72 (2011) Ohio State L.J. 1343-1366. 
8 Meghan Benton & Meg Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The 
Select Committees in the House of Commons’, (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs, 772-797. Hereinafter 
Benton & Russell. 
9 See Stephen Sedley QC “Public Inquiries: A Cure or a Disease?” (1989) 52 MLR 469, 472. 
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investigatory culture oriented towards accountability. This is despite Article 29 of the 
Irish Constitution expressly requiring that the Government “shall be responsible” to the 
lower house of parliament, Dáil Éireann. This undesirably laconic endorsement of a 
Westminster model of accountability has, however, been undercut by modern political 
realities. Public cynicism regarding the Oireachtas’ oversight role developed alongside 
revelations of corruption and incompetence in the early 1990s. Signature scandals 
involving widespread tax evasion, political collusion with the beef industry and 
corruption in the planning system, were viewed as emblematic of the failure of 
parliament to interrupt the abuse of public office. The failed attempts by the Oireachtas 
to scrutinise the links between Ministers and the beef industry, resulted in the comment 
of the Chair of the resulting Beef Tribunal that: 
“I think that if the questions that were asked in the Dáil were answered in the way 
they are answered here, there would be no necessity for this inquiry and an awful lot 
of money and time would have been saved.”10 
While party loyalty is not peculiar to Ireland, statistics in the lead up to the economic 
crash indicated that it was higher than the European average.11 Its effect is ironically 
shown by the counterfactual success of the Dáil Committee on Public Accounts (PAC), 
which is made up of thirteen members: six Government backbenchers, six opposition 
backbenchers and a chair who is by convention a leading member of the opposition. 
This unusual operation reflects the fact that its existence dates back before party control 
was dominant. The Committee is tasked with examining the accounts of Government 
departments, which is achieved through the audit reports of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, an independent constitutional office. Outside of this, Ireland’s 
electoral and political culture has not incentivised committee work, with the emphasis 
being upon politicians’ role as constituency representatives.12 A cycle of redundancy 
developed, with the low impact of committees reinforcing the focus upon 
intercessionary work over broader accountability functions. 
                                                           
10 See Fintan O’Toole, Meanwhile, Back at the Ranch (Vintage, London, 1995), 241. 
11 David Farrell, Peter Mair, Séin Ó Muineacháin & Matthew Wall, “Courting, but not always serving: 
Perverted Burkeanism and the puzzle of Irish Parliamentary Cohesion”, (2012) Paper presented at a 
conference in UBC, Vancouver to mark Ken Carty’s retirement. Available at 
http://researchrepository.ucd.ie/bitstream/handle/10197/4329/Carty_chapter_final.pdf?sequence=1 
accessed 16 June 2014. 
12 The growth in Independent T.D.s in the past two elections, however, may result in greater incentives 
for rebellion – recent parliamentary reforms both underline and, may benefit from, this development. 
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In addition to a lack of political incentives, the conduct of parliamentary inquiries is 
heavily regulated. The landmark case of Re Haughey13 laid down strict natural justice 
requirements where fundamental rights, including the constitutional right to good 
name, are affected. As allegations pertaining to Mr Haughey’s involvement in gun 
running had been made before the parliamentary inquiry the Court held that he was 
entitled to extensive procedural protections. These included a copy of the evidence 
which had reflected on his good name, the right to cross examine his accusers, the 
opportunity to adduce rebutting evidence and to address the Committee. These features 
in effect constitutionalise the “cardinal principles” to minimise the risk of injustice 
identified by the 1966 Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry in the United 
Kingdom.14 
The Haughey case led to increased complexity in the conduct of inquiries, but more 
serious and comparatively unique constitutional developments took place in the 
landmark case of Ardagh v Maguire.15 This arose out of the inquiry by a subcommittee 
of the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights into a fatal 
shooting by Gardai. The Supreme Court endorsed the power of the Oireachtas to 
operate committees, but significantly narrowed their investigatory remit and ability to 
make findings of fact. While the majority held that the Dáil could make findings of fact 
and culpability within the immediate sphere of central government departments, outside 
of this, it had only a limited power to conduct inquiries where this would directly aid 
its function of legislating. We will discuss the reasoning underpinning the case in our 
discussion of the recent referendum that sought to overturn the effects of the ruling. 
The weaknesses in parliamentary oversight led, in part, to a knock-on reliance upon 
Tribunals of Inquiry, and latterly, the Commission of Investigation. The experiences of 
the 1990s and 2000s, however, led to the effective disavowal of the tribunal mechanism 
as unwieldy and expensive. Tribunals were increasingly viewed as a crisis management 
tool for politicians, not least because the extensive delays inherent in their final 
reporting facilitated the dissipation of the very public concern that triggered the inquiry. 
A Comptroller and Auditor General report into their operation attributed the delays to 
“wide terms of reference” and the amendment of the investigations’ scope while they 
                                                           
13 [1971] IR 217. 
14 Report of the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry (Cmnd. 3121 November 1966). 
15 Ardagh v Maguire (n 3). 
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were still in progress.16 While formally independent, tribunal investigations were 
marred by negative political dynamics. The Mahon Tribunal Report acknowledged that 
a “sustained and virulent attack” had been made on it by senior Government ministers, 
in order “to undermine the efficient conduct of the Tribunal’s inquiries, erode its 
independence and collapse its inquiry”.17 The de facto replacement of the tribunal 
model with new Commission of Inquiry mechanism, which eschews public hearings 
with the aim of achieving expedited process, will feature in our discussion of Ireland’s 
investigatory response to its economic collapse. 
Against this backdrop, there have been few landmark parliamentary inquiries which 
have captured widespread public attention. The most instanced example is the DIRT 
inquiry, where the PAC investigated the use of bogus non-residential bank accounts 
established to avoid payment of the Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT). That 
inquiry was facilitated by the passing of the Comptroller and Auditor General and 
Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Special Provisions) Act 1998 which gave 
the PAC powers to compel people to give evidence. Generally regarded as an 
accountability success story, it must be stressed that the committee benefitted from an 
extensive initial investigation by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The 
Comptroller’s report did not make any conclusions on the events surrounding the failure 
to pay tax, but left it to the Committee to carry out oral hearings based on its findings. 
The success of the resulting PAC investigation was in large part because the CAG 
report provided a sound base for those hearings. Significantly, however, while inquiry 
is held up as a model for future inquiries, its final report failed to censure or sanction 
any civil servant or minister for their actions in relation to the events. Condemnation 
was reserved for the financial institutions – an emphasis which was arguably 
endangered by the later Ardagh ruling.  
 
Those advocating for a renewed appreciation of the importance of the institution have 
thus relied upon comparative developments. In the aftermath of Ardagh, O’Dowd 
undertook an extensive analysis of how that decision threatened to place the Oireachtas 
                                                           
16 Comptroller and Auditor General, Special Report: Tribunals of Inquiry (Stationery Office, Dublin, 
2008). The Mahon Tribunal took over ten years to finalise, with some of its core recommendations still 
remaining unimplemented. 
17 Alan Mahon, Final Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into certain Planning Matters and Payments (The 
Stationary Office, Dublin, 2012), 22. 
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out of step with European jurisdictions.18 The Irish position certainly contrasts the 
increasing status of, and emphasis upon, parliamentary inquiries in the United 
Kingdom. These have attracted greater resourcing and increased media attention. 
Recent high profile inquiries include the News of the World hacking scandal, the 
banking crisis and the collapse of the “Kid’s Company” charity. The latter two subject 
matters have equivalent Irish inquiries we discuss later in this article – underlining the 
divergence between the two jurisdictions. 
A landmark study of the Select Committee system by Russell and Benton provided an 
insight into their distinct contribution to, and overall influence upon, policy reform. The 
report’s quantitative analysis found that 40 per cent of inquiries’ recommendations 
were accepted by the UK government, of which 44% went on to be implemented – a 
figure amounting to 450 recommendations a year.19 In terms of added value, only 20 
per cent of recommendations related to policies covered by manifestos or Queen’s 
speeches – indicating that the committee’s work was inhabiting a distinct focus upon 
the “detailed delivery of policy”.20 Significantly, however, the study moved beyond a 
simple analysis into the qualitative sphere – permitting a more subtle evaluation of the 
forms of influence exerted by Committee members and the preventative and 
prospective regulatory effects of having an active inquiry mechanism upon everyday 
government. These were found to include: 
- Influencing policy debate 
- Spotlighting issues and altering policy priorities 
- Brokering in policy disputes 
- Providing expert evidence 
- Holding government and outside bodies accountable 
- Exposure 
- Generating fear (anticipated reactions). 
The study revealed that the anticipated reactions of a committee exerted a powerful 
influence upon government and administrators in ‘getting across their brief’ and 
                                                           
18 John O’Dowd, ‘Knowing How Way Leads onto Way: Some Reflections on the Abbeylara Decision’ 
(2003) Irish Jurist 162. 
19 Benton & Russell (n.8), 9. The report found over 60% of small or no change recommendations were 
accepted while only around a third of those calling for medium or large change were accepted. 
20 Ibid at 8. 
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abandoning policies. The emerging work which surrounds the “age of the select 
committee”21 in the United Kingdom, thus underlines that the marginalising of the 
parliamentary inquiry mechanism, whether due to legal restraints or political culture, 
would have negative impacts upon regulatory and policy evaluation. 
This historical analysis of Ireland’s inquiries landscape has underlined a number of 
critical trends, which recur across jurisdictions. While their relative strength may be 
idiosyncratic to Ireland, the impact of party political discipline, the low valuing of 
oversight work and the difficulty of acting quasi judicially in conducting investigations, 
represent key constraints upon effective parliamentary oversight. The use of judicial 
led inquiries to diffuse initial controversy, and their overburdening with expansive 
terms of reference has often produced prominent instances of delay, followed by dulled 
political and public reception of recommendations. Ireland is unique however, for the 
manner in which its economic collapse saw the question of effective inquiries gain 
unprecedented public prominence, commencing with the 2013 constitutional 
referendum on parliamentary inquiries. 
The Ghosts of McCarthyism? Parliamentary Inquiries and the Ardagh Decision 
The proposed 30th Constitutional amendment sought to overturn the restrictions 
imposed on the Oireachtas by the Supreme Court in Ardagh. The proposed amendment 
granted the power to conduct inquiries “into any matter…of general public 
importance”, and permission “to make findings in respect of the conduct of [any] 
person”.22 In order to understand the eventual rejection by the people of this 
amendment, it is necessary to discuss the legal and policy reasons for the 2003 Supreme 
Court ruling. 
The ruling that the Constitution granted no inherent power to the Oireachtas to 
investigate and make findings of culpability against private individuals, was primarily 
motivated by a desire to protect the individual against excessively politicised 
                                                           
21 Meg Russell & Meghan Benton, ‘Selective Influence: The Policy Impact of House of Commons Select 
Committees’, UCL Constitution Unit (London, UCL, 2011), Patrick Dunleavy & Dominic Muir 
‘Revisiting Rebuilding the House: the impact of the Wright Reforms’ (Report, HC82, 2013). 
22 Wording published in the Schedule to the Thirtieth Amendment of the Constitution (Houses of the 
Oireachtas Inquiries) Bill 2011 as initiated. The proposal inserted three new subsections into subsection 
10 of Article 15 of the Constitution. 
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investigation. The Supreme Court’s emphasis upon the individual’s right to a good 
name has its roots in Article 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution: 
“The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack 
and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property 
rights of every citizen.” 
This duty is qualified on its terms, but the members of the majority, manifested a 
concern at the ability of the Oireachtas to make the personalised findings which had 
marked the era of Senator McCarthy and the House of Representatives Committee on 
Unamerican Activities.23 The specific circumstances of the inquiry at the centre of the 
case led to a judgment of unduly broad consequence. Stressing the ‘adjudicative’ 
character of the Committee’s work, the Court pointed to the close relationship between 
a finding of “unlawful killing” envisioned by the inquiry’s terms of reference, and the 
criminal offence of manslaughter.24 While counsel for the committee argued that any 
findings would be legally sterile in that no legal rights would be directly affected, the 
Court rejected this as something of a fiction given the likely practical impact on 
individual reputations.25 The majority also did not view the re Haughey rights as an 
adequate protection of the right to a good name.  
Keane CJ, in dissent, argued that the right to a good name had to be balanced against” 
the right, and indeed the duty” of the Oireachtas to inquire and inform itself as may be 
necessary to perform its constitutional role.26 The majority, stressed however, that 
while Article 28.2 provides that “The Government shall be responsible” to the lower 
house, the term “Government” refers merely to the fifteen members of the cabinet and 
their related departments. Outside of this immediate sphere of central government, the 
Oireachtas had only a limited inherent power to conduct inquiries, where these directly 
aid their legislative functions.27 
                                                           
23 See the judgment of Hardiman J. in Ardagh (n 3) at 693. While stressing that the conduct of the 
Committee was in no way comparable to such a witch hunt, His Honour warned that “in neither…the 
United Kingdom and the United States, where an "inherent" parliamentary power of inquiry is or has 
been acknowledged, has its record been an inspiring one from the point of view of human rights or civil 
liberties.”  
24 ibid 563 (Denham J), 588-590 (Murray J) and 662-64. (Hardiman J). 
25 ibid 668 (Hardiman J). 
26 ibid 501 (Keane J). 
27 Under Article 15.2.1, Parliament is vested with sole law-making power in the State. 
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The majority did not view findings of individual culpability as generally connected to 
the question of whether legislation needed to be passed. Murray J argued that the 
Oireachtas could investigate and “make extensive findings and recommendations of 
great public and legislative import”, but failed to see the “necessity of making findings 
of personal culpability” against individual police officers.28 Geoghegan J stressed that 
“the all important point” was for the inquiry to “be merely for the purpose of 
considering whether any new legislation was required and for no other purpose”.29 
The Supreme Court’s attempts to separate direct findings against individuals from a 
factual finding about a system or institution from which individual blame may be 
inferred has since emerged as the key faultline in the conduct of inquiries. Geoghegan 
J accepted that an inquiry convened for a permissible legislative purpose “might in 
some circumstances inevitably and unavoidably lead to implied blame being attached 
to an individual”.30 For instance a finding of failure in a management system would 
involve an “implied attachment of blame to the relevant manager”.31 Hardiman J, 
similarly endorsed the idea of “implied blame”, but underlined that: 
“So long as this is genuinely incidental, and not a mere device, this incidental overlap 
does not, in my view, even potentially invalidate [an exercise of inquiry power]”32 
As we shall see, the sophistry of separating blame inferred from systemic findings from 
the direct attribution of individual wrongdoing can culminate in extensive parsing and 
semantic redrafting in committee reports. As Morgan argues “implied blame is a very 
slippery standard for a lawyer to advise upon or for a court to rule upon.”33 This is 
underlined by the judicial statements above, which require that the attribution of blame 
be “inevitably” or “unavoidably” required for creation of new legislation (Geoghegan) 
or that it be “genuinely incidental” to that function (Hardiman). Ultimately the Supreme 
Court provided little practical guidance to the Oireachtas as to how the drafting of 
inquiry findings can establish or prove this connection; a failure which has contributed 
to the hollowing out of final reports in the face of reputational litigation. Differentiating 
                                                           
28 Ardagh (n 3), 605 (Murray J). 
29 ibid 708. 
30 ibid 718. 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid 659. 
33 David G Morgan, ‘Parliamentary Inquiries: The Context of the Joint Oireachtas Committee’s 
Proposals’ [2011] Cork Online Law Review, 11. 
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issues relating to an individual’s culpability on the one hand and wider systemic failures 
and government errors on the other is fundamental to characterising the underlying 
cause of government errors. While reaching findings directly linked to criminal 
culpability may be harder to justify, the Oireachtas, will often need to determine the 
blameworthiness of past actions as this helps it to properly characterise the mischief to 
be addressed in future legislation or to avoid the passing of misdirected legislation. 
The failure of the 2013 referendum underlined some public support for the Court’s fear 
of political overreach. Crucially, in addition to providing an unrestricted right to inquire 
into any matter of “general public importance”, the proposed amendment attempted to 
loosen the fetters of re Haughey by permitting a balancing of procedural fairness 
against the public interest: 
 “It shall be for the House or Houses concerned to determine, with due regard to the 
principles of fair procedures, the appropriate balance between the rights of persons 
and the public interest for the purposes of ensuring an effective inquiry...”34 
This wording attracted controversy, as it was considered vague by many commentators 
- a fact acknowledged by the independent Referendum Commission.35 While the 
principle of harmonious interpretation of constitutional provisions meant that the 
protection of the individual’s good name would be taken into account, the proposed 
wording appeared designed to attract judicial deference when reviewing the balance 
struck.  
In a surprising result (given the levels of support in initial polling) the amendment was 
defeated. An official study into the reasons found firstly a prominent belief36 amongst 
‘No’ voters that the proposed wording gave too much power to politicians. Secondly, 
voters split according to their trust in legal experts versus politicians; the former group 
more likely to vote no, with the latter group more likely to vote yes.37 The role of legal 
commentators in leading opposition had attracted criticism from Government, with the 
                                                           
34 Above n 22. 
35 The Chair of Commission, Justice McMahon commented in a radio interview that it was “not possible 
to state definitively what role, if any, the courts would have in reviewing procedures if adopted.” See 
Harry McGee, ‘Five Reasons Why Referendum was Lost’, The Irish Times, (Dublin, November 1 2011). 
36 This belief was cited as the primary reason for their vote by 27% of No voters. Michael Marsh, Jane 
Suiter & Theresa Reidy, Report on Reasons Behind Voter Behaviour in the Oireachtas Inquiry 
Referendum 2011, (2012). Available at http://per.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/OIReferendum-Report-
Final-2003-corrected.pdf accessed 28 June 2016, 2. 
37 Ibid.  
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then Minister for Foreign Affairs attributing it to “particular sections of the legal 
profession who have done very well financially from the judicial tribunals in the past".38 
This comment reflected Government efforts to project the renewal of parliamentary 
inquiries as a replacement for tribunals - underlining a recurring failure to appreciate 
the division of labour between two institutions of distinctive character and purposes. 
Ultimately, the compressed timeline for discussion of the proposal led to a lack of 
knowledge on the part of public, which led to a crucial portion voting ‘no’.39 The study 
found there was still widespread ‘in principle’ public support for providing inquiry 
powers to the Oireachtas.40 The Government’s terminal error, therefore, lay in 
conflating the issue of freedom to reach findings with that of the standard of procedural 
fairness to be applied by committees. 
Lost in Translation? The Flaws of the 2013 Act 
In the absence of a constitutional amendment, the Government set about clarifying the 
prevailing nature and scope of inquiries in the Houses of the Oireachtas (Inquiries, 
Privileges and Procedures) Act 2013. This legislation, however, adopted a strict 
structure which, in our view, is an unhelpfully constricted translation of the Ardagh 
decision. Rather than affirming the necessity of implied blame, and the connection of 
inquiry findings with legislative functions, elements of the Act adopt a defensive 
approach which embody the chilling effect of potential litigation rather than a positive 
vision of a renewed forum. 
Part 2 of the act establishes the new forms of parliamentary inquiry, including: 
- Inquire, Record and Report inquiry (section 7);  
- Legislative inquiry (section 8);  
- Inquiry to Hold the Government to Account (section 11).41 
                                                           
38 Michael Brennan & Dearbhail McDonald, ‘Top legal experts call for No vote in new poll’, Irish 
Independent (Dublin, 24 October 2011). 
39 Above n 36 at 3. Large numbers of ‘yes’ voters could not recall the arguments for a ‘yes’ vote (42%) 
or ‘no’ voters for a ‘no’ vote (42%). 
40 ibid. 
41 In this article we are focusing on general parliamentary inquiries not inquiries which are anchored in 
the misconduct of certain constitutional offices such as parliamentary members or the judiciary. 
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These inquiry forms are sealed from one another, and are an attempt to provide 
legislative underpinings for the Ardagh restrictions. The first point of distinction is the 
character of findings which may be made. A section 7 inquiry is permitted to arrive at 
facts only where they are uncontested. A section 8 inquiry allows contested fact finding 
including findings of relevant misbehaviour against public office holders, where the 
terms of reference for the inquiry expressly provide for that power.42 A section 11 
inquiry, the only directly tied to accountability, reflects the Supreme Court’s definition 
of Government in Article 28.4, allowing for vigorous review of core government 
departments and office holders.  
This basic segmentation must, however, be overlaid with section 17(3).43 This attempts 
to funnel some of the unfortunate sophistry from the Ardagh judgment by stating that 
committees remain free to: 
“…make a finding that any matter relating to systems, practices, procedures or 
policy or arrangements for the implementation of policy which fall within the subject 
[of the inquiry] ought to have been carried out in a different manner.”44 
This wording is opaque, as it is arguable that an individual manager’s oversight or 
negligence could constitute a “matter relating to” policy or systems which needed to be 
avoided. Such findings of fact may be inevitable accompaniments to systemic findings 
about institutional failings. Where inquiries are mandated to explore legislative reform 
they need to be able to identify the general character of the mischief any legislative 
amendment would be combatting; findings which include implied blame may therefore 
be an inevitable and essential component of this process.  
The veneer of section 17 masks powerful constitutional undertows. It can lure 
committees into unnecessarily abstract institutional findings, or it can mask the 
requirement that findings related to individuals be tangibly linked to the legislative 
function.  The very existence of a section 7 inquiry model is itself illustrative of the 
                                                           
42 Section 8(3) of the Act. 
43 For example in section 11 an inquiry can make findings impugning the good name of “an 
officeholder … of the government in his or her capacity … as such officeholder” (section 11(2)(i)(II)) or 
“the chief executive officer … of a public body that is subject to scrutiny by the Committee of Public 
Accounts” (section 11(2)(i)(III)). 





Oireachtas’ struggle to integrate the Supreme Court ruling into its deliberations. As 
conceived under the 2013 Act, Section 7 is in many respects the very type of inquiry 
the Supreme Court was keen to repudiate: the construction of a factual narrative simply 
for the purposes of the public record. While a section 7 inquiry cannot find facts which 
have been contested during the course of its evidence gathering, the existence of section 
17(3) complicates this picture. The Banking Inquiry ultimately struggled to navigate 
the nature of section 17(3) findings and their interconnection with individuals’ conduct. 
In this context, it was surprising the Oireachtas chose to designate the Banking Inquiry 
as a section 7 inquire, record and report inquiry. Given that the fact finding powers of 
this type of inquiry are so limited, why was the inquiry not established under section 8? 
Why not carry out an inquiry focused not on story telling but instead on the failure of 
the legislative and regulatory system with a view to designing a better financial 
framework? This would have allowed the inquiry to make findings of fact, at least in 
relation to public office holders. It would also have embedded an institutional focus 
upon practical legislative reforms in learning from the crisis. A review of parliamentary 
debates contains further insight into the potential for the separate models to confuse the 
constitutional position and misdirect politicians as to its focus.  When questioned as to 
whether a “hybrid inquiry” involving section 7 (IRR) and section 8 (legislative) could 
be run in relation to the Banking Inquiry, the Minister for Reform and Public 
Expenditure responded that “one cannot intersperse the two types of inquiry because 
one has to have a constitutional grounding for each bit of it.”45 
The picture is further confused by the fact that the terms of reference for the Banking 
Inquiry ultimately called for the Joint Committee to make recommendations, including 
ones calling for legislative action. One might question what the point of 
recommendations are in a section 7 inquiry where the primary purpose of investigation 
is to provide a public record. As recommendations must arise from a committee’s 
findings, there is an argument that the committee was more limited in the 
recommendations it could make than if a section 8 framework had been applied.Why 
did the Oireachtas choose to confine itself within a section 7 straightjacket? This 
question haunted the Banking Inquiry and their frustration is apparent in their final 
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report where, as we discuss later, they included a flawed proposal for yet another form 
of inquiry to be created through amending the 2013 Act. Ultimately, the structural focus 
of the legislation is artificial, and committees will have to closely reason through the 
Ardagh ruling in creating their final reports and recommendations. 
There is little evidence that the 2013 Act has led to increased clarity in Committees’ 
role or promoted a sense of legal security which would encourage inquiry teams to press 
the penumbral concepts at the heart of Ardagh. The Oireachtas’ reaction to the Supreme 
Court judgment has been a practical timidity, which is fed by a rhetoric of institutional 
defeatism. The Banking Inquiry channelled this climate in its final report by stating that 
Ardagh had “effectively sounded the death knell for parliamentary inquiries over the 
next decade”.46 This places too heavy a responsibility on the Supreme Court decision, 
ignoring the scope for the court’s judgment to be effectively integrated into the 
Oireachtas’ workings. Morgan, notes a similar pessimism on the part of the Mini-CTC 
Signalling Inquiry, which in abandoning its investigation after Ardagh, provided a 
“swansong [taking] the form of an impassioned Interim Report which reached no 
conclusions on the issues before it but instead offered a heartfelt lament, with lavish 
references to the separation of powers, at the lack of capacity to which it had been 
reduced.” 47 
A climate of confusion, combined with a fear of overstepping, remain evident even 
following the introduction of the 2013 Act. In April 2014, former senior executives of 
the voluntary organisation, the Rehab Group, having initially participated in committee 
proceedings, refused to appear before a PAC hearing to answer questions regarding 
their pay structure and the use of public funds. The head of the organisation, Ms Angela 
Kerins, argued that following her resignation, she and other ex-members were 
“ordinary citizens” and could avail of the Ardagh precedent. The PAC sought 
authorisation from the Committee on Procedure and Privilege to compel the attendance 
of Ms Kerins and others. This, however was refused on the basis that questioning them 
would be “outside the remit” of PAC and that “a mis-step will cost the taxpayer”.48 
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Despite this, Ms Kerins nevertheless issued proceedings against PAC against their 
earlier hearing into the matter, terming it a “witch hunt” and alleging that the committee 
members were affected by bias and a lack of procedural fairness.49  
 
The eventual High Court ruling in Kerins did not modify the Ardagh principles, but 
rather focused upon when a committee can be said to be exercising what it termed 
“adjudicative” or “compulsory and determinative” jurisdiction, and thus be bound by 
the rules of constitutional justice.50 The Court stressed that outside of the interactions 
in which the person has been compelled to appear, individual parliamentarians' views 
attract privilege, even if stridently expressed.51 While media coverage focused upon the 
vindication of this tradition of parliamentary privilege, the Kerins case is, in our view, 
likely to produce a formalization of parliamentary interactions. Given that 
representatives’ comments to those voluntarily appearing before committees attract 
privilege, legal representatives of these individuals are likely to advise them not to 
attend out of caution for their reputation. It is likely that future appearances before 
committees have to rely upon statutory requests to appear. 
Matching the Forum to the Fuss – Towards the Effective Design of Oireachtas Inquiries 
Beyond the specific choice of inquiry format there remains the question of how an 
inquiry is individually designed to match “the fuss”. The design of suitable and 
effective terms of reference is critical to ensure that an inquiry firstly understands its 
purpose, and secondly, can achieve that purpose in producing focused findings and 
realisable recommendations. At the commencement of the banking inquiry the Joint 
Committee stressed the need for “realistic and achievable” aims, a “clear purpose” and 
an investigation which “should be capable of completion within a realistic timeframe 
and take account of the lifetime of the current Dáil and Seanad”.52 In practice, however 
it became an example of an inquiry that wanted to do too much, too quickly. 
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The Banking Inquiry is also highly instructive regarding the critical question as to what 
should be the focus of a parliamentary inquiry in the era of independent public inquiry. 
There had already been multiple inquiries into various elements of the banking crisis, 
the most high-profile being the Nyberg Commission of Investigation. The Joint 
Committee viewed this work as a solid departure point, allowing itself to focus on 
answering “the key questions that remain behind the banking crisis”.53 The debate 
regarding the terms of reference thus began promisingly, by considering how existing 
investigatory work could intersect with the parliamentary element. 
 
In debating the added value of a parliamentary inquiry, one unifying theme across 
political parties was the need for public hearings or visible accountability. The Nyberg 
Commission had elected, at the outset, to grant anonymity to its interviewees in its final 
report. While the Commission was seeking to stave off potential litigation, it also 
presented privacy and anonymity as positive virtues for effective investigation. Mr 
Nyberg argued that anonymity “was important to get engagement and for discussing 
sensitive issues”54 As the first witness before the Banking Inquiry, Mr Nyberg testified 
that he felt it was unlikely that witnesses would be as forthcoming as they were to the 
Commission. While he himself felt there was little need for a parliamentary inquiry into 
the crisis, he accepted that the committee could look at established issues “in greater 
depth” as well as focusing upon forming “a good and solid view on what to do to avoid 
something like this another time”.55 
 
Thus the process of public questioning emerged as a primary motive in creating and 
designing the inquiry. In debates concerning the terms of reference, the independent 
T.D. Peter Matthews argued that while the public did not have time to read the extensive 
technical reports of independent experts, they did “need to see visibly those who had 
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the fiduciary responsibility.”56 The Chairman of the Inquiry ultimately fell back upon 
the public nature of the proceedings as having “set this inquiry apart”, allowing the Irish 
people “for the first time to hear the story, in their own words, from those who were 
involved”.57  
As Elliot has argued, the use of public hearings affirms the important links between 
accountability and transparency: 
 
“the ascription of responsibility function potentially served by inquiries, while not 
unimportant, [can] shade into – in some senses, exists in the shadow of – the broader 
transparency function…which serves to equip the public, politicians and media to 
form their own views”58 
In the Irish context, the most significant impacts produced by the much criticized 
Tribunals of Inquiry was the coverage of the hearing phase rather than the publication 
of the highly technical, much delayed final reports.59 The general tone of media 
coverage of the banking inquiry was that oral hearing produced no ‘silver bullets’,60 
but the mere appearance of a number of banking figures who had previously never 
commented publicly was nonetheless viewed as important as a matter of principle. 
While academics may be drawn to substantive findings, the holding of hearings 
recognizes that political accountability is not an objective idea, but is rather, as Black 
comments, a “relational concept” which is “socially and discursively constituted”.61 
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A second aspect which emerged was the need to, within the constraints of the 
constitutional framework, facilitate a broader societal discussion of underlying 
responsibility. This reflected the fact that the Nyberg Commission had interpreted its 
mandate as being “to identify the causes for failures, rather than to assign individual 
blame or responsibility”.62 The Commission’s report had not named any politician or 
political party within its pages, a fact which attracted much public and media criticism. 
Its strongest statement regarding political responsibility was strikingly opaque: 
“People in a position to make decisions are and must be ultimately responsible for 
them regardless of what advice or suggestions they have received … the higher and 
more influential their position, the greater their responsibility.”63 
The confusion around the Commission’s characterisation of professional misjudgement 
and political responsibility persisted in testimony before the Joint Committee. When 
asked why his report found excessive risk taking to have been motivated by “ignorance 
or a lack of knowledge”, rather than “negligence”, Mr Nyberg responded that 
“negligence implies some sort of wilfulness, and I don’t see it”.64 These comments 
underline the difficulty a technical expert faces in handling concepts of political 
responsibility and blameworthiness. If a public inquiry is tasked with moving beyond 
a bare analysis of legality, and its terms of reference do not address what is to be 
understood as culpable action, the question of how the inquiry is to generate a legitimate 
yardstick for ascribing responsibility inevitably results in contestation. 
 
While the joint committee’s emphasis upon transparency and political accounting was 
welcome, the terms of reference debate quickly tipped over into an unqualified need to 
have a “full telling” of all elements of the crisis. Deputy Lynch had originally stressed 
that the inquiry “should be understandable in what it will set out to achieve and 
measureable in its objectives and terms of references”.65 However, its ultimate scope 
was relatively unconfined: 
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“The subject matter of the inquiry shall be to inquire into the reasons Ireland 
experienced a systemic banking crisis, including the political, economic, social, 
cultural, financial and behavioural factors and policies which impacted on or 
contributed to the crisis, by investigating relevant matters relating to banking 
systems and practices, regulatory and supervisory systems and practices, crisis 
management systems, and policy responses and the preventative reforms 
implemented in the wake of the crisis.”66 
It had initially appeared that the terms of reference for the inquiry would be narrower; 
focused upon the 2008 decision to bail out the banks. This, however, attracted the 
criticism that a longer term perspective was required in order to effectively understand 
how those decisions were made.  The inquiry was ultimately divided into four broad 
“modules”: 
• context 
• banking systems and practices 
• regulatory systems and practices 
• crisis management and policy responses.67 
The terms of reference were thus largely permissive rather than targeted, with the 
inquiry covering areas reviewed by past investigations. The first module in particular 
involved restatements of the broad context of the banking crisis presented by experts 
who were not directly implicated or involved in key decisions. This tended to reinforce 
the public view of the inquiry as providing nothing new. The final module, however, 
was more activist as it extended the inquiry not only in terms of time but also 
complexity, requiring analysis of the actions of the current government, and their 
interaction with the Troika (IMF, ECB and European Commission).  
The settling of the terms of reference is inevitably marked by political dynamics – but 
research into their character often does not match the public’s expectations. The leading 
study on the appointment and design of inquiries in the United Kingdom found that 
short term political considerations are often dominant over the more long term political 
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risk of a critical report in the future.68 This dynamic was borne out in the banking 
inquiry, as the government yielded to political pressure to submit its own actions to 
review. The political preoccupation was to present an image of the inquiry as 
representing a “full accounting” of the controversial events. Unfortunately, the resultant 
breadth and vagueness of the terms of reference did not seem to indicate a forensic or 
well-focussed process with a clear sense of its potential value add over other inquiry 
mechanisms.  
Despite the call to “leave our club jerseys at the committee room door”,69 the inquiry 
also suffered an immediate politicisation over the election of its membership. After two 
government senators failed to attend the Senate sub-committee electing representatives 
for the inquiry, and were denied a ‘pair’, the opposition parties voted two of their 
number onto the inquiry committee. The Government, condemning the opposition’s 
action as a ‘stroke’ immediately added two of its own senators, aiming to preserve its 
majority on the inquiry committee.70 This move triggered the resignation from the 
inquiry of prominent Independent TD Stephen Donnelly, who argued that such 
interference underlined that the inquiry would be politically motivated.71 While the 
Government stressed that the whip would not be applied to its members in the 
Committee, the dispute around the election of the members seemed to reiterate the 
undertow of party political concern moving participants. 
Prisoners of Legalism? Politicians as Investigators 
The eventual establishment of the inquiry was regarded as a landmark moment for the 
self-identity of the parliamentary inquiry mechanism. Chairman Ciaran Lynch TD 
stated it was “an opportunity for our Parliament to demonstrate that it can carry out a 
fair and balanced inquiry to answer the key questions that remain behind the banking 
crisis”.72 The loss of the 30th amendment had focused the attention of the Oireachtas on 
the fact that the public was fearful of politicians with too much power and too strong a 
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desire for political grandstanding, with Mary Lou McDonald TD reminding the Select 
Sub-Committee examining the 2013 Bill: 
“I recall the public commentary and angst at the time of the referendum. There 
was a sense that committees could become Star Chambers or a facility for a 
witch hunt...”73 
The deep scepticism of the idea of politicians as principled investigators appears to 
have led to a highly cautious approach to Re Haughey during the conduct of the inquiry. 
Members complained about the “highly legalistic” requirements including a 
requirement that parties who were likely to be criticised during the hearings should 
have advance notice of these potential comments and the relevant line of questioning.74 
It is important, however, particularly in the aftermath of the inquiries referendum 
campaign, to separate the requirements of procedural fairness from debates concerning 
Ardagh. Despite political rhetoric of legal roadblocks, there are also, as we shall 
discuss, a range of practical measures which can moderate the impact of re Haughey 
requirements. 
In appraising the investigative discipline of the committee, we would argue that the two 
signature moments of the inquiry were procedural missteps. Both grew out of a desire 
to pursue distinctive lines of inquiry and to deliver accountability ‘moments’ which 
would connect with the public. The first controversy related to the efforts of the 
Committee to obtain evidence from Jean Claude Trichet. Mr Trichet, former Governor 
of the European Central Bank, initially refused to appear before the committee on the 
grounds that the ECB was accountable to European structures, not to national 
parliaments. In the event, following interventions by the Taoiseach, an informal event 
was hosted by Irish Institute of International and European Affairs. At this event, Mr 
Trichet gave a general speech, followed by two other speakers, with a question and 
answer session following. This took the form of two questions submitted by the 
Institute, six questions by Committee Members, two questions submitted by the 
Institute, and six questions by Committee Members. The decision of the Committee to 
participate in this event drew criticism, particularly from the family of the late Minister 
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Brian Lenihan.75 As Mr Trichet’s testimony was in contradiction to statements 
previously made by Mr Lenihan, the family criticised the failure to administer an oath 
and argued that “the setting was wrong”.76 It was also reported that many committee 
members were unhappy with the format, but had accepted it as a “workable 
compromise”.77 
During the event, the Chairman of the Inquiry indicated that the evidence would play a 
role in the Inquiry’s deliberations: 
“The purposes of this event were at all times to provide the inquiry with an 
engagement that would be evidential, that would be admissible in terms of our final 
report…”78 
Deputy Lynch noted that the event would form a basis for follow up with the Vice 
President of the European Central Bank when he also “engaged informally” with 
Inquiry Members as part of his appearance before another parliamentary committee.79  
The above comments however, triggered the withdrawal of the ECB from this informal 
engagement. ECB Governor Mario Draghi attributed this to Deputy Lynch’s comments 
which, he argued, underlined that further engagement “would have amounted to the 
ECB de facto participating in the inquiry and hence discharging accountability to the 
Oireachtas, which is the prerogative of the European Parliament”.80 While the ECB was 
willing to engage in “an exchange of views” concerning “the ECB’s monetary policy 
in the euro area”, it would not attend any session whose agenda was to address “the 
ECB’s mandate in the context of Ireland’s Banking Crisis 2006-2013”.81 The 
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Oireachtas Committee had already displayed extraordinary flexibility around 
procedures in its treatment of Mr Trichet, and the limited statutory remit for any fact 
finding against ECB actors seemed to underline that the distinction between 
“accountability” and “an exchange of views” was dubious. The Committee’s difficult 
balancing act between pragmatic negotiation and investigatory legitimacy collapsed, 
damaging public esteem and the exhaustiveness of the evidence base on key issues. 
The inquiry’s public standing was further damaged by the controversy which erupted 
around the potential giving of evidence by David Drumm, the former head of Anglo 
Irish Bank, who had left Ireland following the collapse of the bank and declared 
bankruptcy in the United States. Mr Drumm had refused to return to Ireland to answer 
questions from Gardai regarding Anglo Irish Bank and the State was pursuing his 
extradition. Mr Drumm contacted the inquiry and indicated his willingness to present 
evidence by videolink.82 Following initial indications by some members that they were 
inclined to accept the offer of video evidence, the Committee ultimately decided against 
this but committed to admitting his written statement into evidence. This approach was 
likely due to the need to avoid inequality of arms for those whose reputation could be 
affected by the testimony, as well as the fear of seeming to provide ‘light touch’ 
treatment to one of the most prominent actors in the banking crisis. It took a dramatic 
late intervention by the Director of Public Prosecutions, however, to prevent the 
publication of Mr Drumm’s written statement. The Director warned that its contents 
could “reasonably be expected to prejudice” pending criminal proceedings against 
members of Anglo Irish Bank, resulting in a hasty retreat by the Joint Committee.83 
The Trichet and Drumm controversies seem to underline that the committee was relying 
upon accessing new information streams to stake a clear identity for the investigation. 
They should, however, also be set in the overall context of inquiry which had heard 
from 128 witnesses over 49 days, drawing together over 50,000 documents.  
Beyond these two specific instances, however, the Joint Committee did, in its final 
report, reflect critically upon the practical ability of parliamentarians to carry out the 
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investigative phase of the inquiries. It also decried the legalism surrounding the 
investigatory process, leading to the recommendation that: 
 
“The 2013 Act should be amended to create a specific type of “inquire, record, 
report” inquiry, with power to make findings in relation to systems, practices, 
procedures or policy only. While this type of inquiry would have no power to 
make findings of fact in relation to a person who was not a member of the 
Houses, it would be subject to less onerous obligations in terms of fair 
procedures and consultation as a result.”84 
 
Confusingly, this recommendation appears predicated upon a bright line separation 
between systemic findings and findings of fact impacting on individuals’ reputation. 
Yet, the Supreme Court ruling itself implies that the two are entangled (hence its 
recognition of the concept of implied blame). Those in management positions and 
relevant institutions can thus argue that re Haughey entitlements are still triggered. 85  
 
The perception that procedural fairness obligations obstruct the efficacy of public 
inquiries needs to be engaged with on substantive policy grounds. The public comments 
made by former members of the Public Accounts Committee that the Kerins86 decision 
was a vindication of their “robust” questioning, suggests that many politicians view 
procedural requirements as a legal imposition rather than a positive scaffold for 
committee findings.87 Officials working within the Oireachtas argued that the Kerins 
affair illustrated the need for some self-regulation through the amendment of the Dail's 
standing orders, but this was dismissed by politicians who viewed as a vindication of 
their freedom of action. There is a danger that undervaluing the need to embed fairness 
into Committee behaviour, whether in voluntary participation or the more formalised 
re Haughey contexts, could reinforce existing public mistrust of the politician as an 
investigator. 
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We believe it would be more beneficial to consider how non-legal measures could 
moderate the burden of re Haughey, not least the careful design of terms of reference 
so that they do not duplicate prior inquiries and are focused in their subject matter and 
objectives. A Joint Committee recommendation of such a character was for the number 
of members of a Committee conducting an inquiry to be capped at seven.88 While this 
could adversely affect the diversity of membership at a time when independents and 
smaller parties are at historic levels of electoral support, it would concentrate public 
visibility upon those parliamentarians participating and avoid fragmentary or 
duplicative questioning. 
 
Another recommendation in this sphere was that a preliminary investigation phase be 
conducted “by expert staff of the Committee” through “appropriate delegation of 
powers to staff, where constitutionally permissible”.89 We would argue, however, that 
the work involved in transitioning to public hearings, and ensuring that all relevant 
matters are assimilated into the Committee’s reasoning is unlikely to lessen the 
administrative burden involved in preparing a final report. The recommendation also 
fails to consider the interaction of parliamentary reviews with statutory inquiries. 
Where an investigation is on the scale of the banking inquiry, a hybrid model should be 
adopted, with the Commission of Investigation conducting the fact finding phase, 
followed by a more focused parliamentary inquiry. The role of this political review 
would be to provide a public airing of the matters involved and to develop regulatory 
and legislative reforms. This demarcation would ensure that the investigatory burden 
falls upon the more forensic institution – the Commission - while the parliamentary 
review is reserved for transparency, public accounting and critically, policy reform. The 
need for this division of labour is further illustrated by flaws in the substantive findings, 
and public impact of, the Banking Inquiry’s Final Report. 
The Banking Inquiry Final Report: Straitjacketed Findings or Distinct Value Add? 
Finally, we evaluate how the shadow of Ardagh shaped the substance of the 
Committee’s final’s Report. The inquire, record and report model, coupled with the 
undeveloped nature of the Committee’s recommendations, frustrated the Inquiry’s 
efforts create a distinctive analysis of the causes of Ireland’s regulatory failures. 
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Nevertheless, the Joint Committee did extend the existing public record in a number of 
respects, with the political ownership of the process and the expressive function of 
public hearings adding additional benefits to existing investigations. 
Efforts to assess the lessons learned from the substance of the final report must first 
recognise the practical difficulties which the Committee faced. The approaching 
general election and the burdensome nature of the terms of reference produced delays 
and conflicts, with time pressures and the density of material nearly causing the 
Committee to fail to agree upon a final draft.  The initial draft of the report was 
described as “completely rushed” with elements of it termed “weak” and “confusing”, 
causing several members to publicly doubt whether one would be produced at all.90 
Significant portions of this initial seven hundred and fifty page draft were ultimately 
discarded. The inquiry formed a “finalisation team” consisting of two committee 
members, two parliamentary assistants, a legal expert and two members of the inquiry’s 
administrative staff. The tight timeline was also contributed to by the legislative 
requirement that the report be sent to those directly affected fourteen days before its 
publication. In the final version, a chairman’s introduction had to replace the intended 
executive summary, which could not be completed due to the time constraints. 
The consultation period on the final report produced an exchange illustrating the 
negative interaction between the complex legal restraints and the compressed timeline 
faced by the Committee. Two of the country’s most prominent property developers 
requested alterations, threatening legal action if the Committee refused.91 They argued 
that the report as written accepted the evidence of the National Asset Management 
Agency (NAMA) without question and requested an opportunity to contest the 
findings. The Committee agreed to remove its references to a letter from NAMA which 
had rejected the developers’ claims.92 It also removed a finding alleging that the 
relationship between bankers and developers was too informal. This move likely 
pointed towards the chilling effects of the legal and time constraints it was operating 
under, as the Committee had previously considered the requests and refused to change 
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the report. Other findings relating the standard of property valuations reflected the 
Committee’s inability to arbitrate contested evidence.93 
In the event two members of the eleven person committee refused to sign the report.94 
One member who did sign commented that it should be understood as “an account of 
the evidence from the public hearings and written testimony”, describing his signing as 
“the signing a body of work. Nobody could be entirely happy with it.  I am certainly 
not”.95 Pearse Doherty T.D., argued that the report lacked analysis, and that “it was 
never the intention that you would take verbatim what people said before the inquiry”.96 
This latter comment illustrates that an inquire, record, report model can, at worst, be 
viewed as the construction of a narrative of least resistance. 
We would argue that the character of the report is more layered, but its contents were 
adversely affected by the sheer breadth of the terms of reference and the reality that, 
with the Oireachtas about to dissolve, any litigation would frustrate publication.  
Reflecting a desire to avoid individualised findings the Report tended towards 
institutional or system level statements. Some of the most prominent findings amounted 
to opaque statements regarding institutional failures.  For instance, the report’s 
treatment of the Financial Regulator, commonly accepted as the most strongly criticised 
entity in it, provided limited analysis of its conduct: 
“Breaches of prudential limits and requirements…were identified by the Financial 
Regulator. However, they relied on moral suasion and protracted correspondence, 
(sometimes for as long a decade) rather than an escalation in the level of formal 
enforcement action. In the years 2000-2008, there was no enforcement action taken 
against any institution for prudential breaches. This reflected an aspect of regulatory 
capture.”97 
This final sentence illustrates the dangers of the overly abstract drafting which may 
emerge in the post Ardagh climate. The concept of “regulatory capture” is not explained 
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or referenced elsewhere in the final report – and is furthermore obscured by finding that 
only “an aspect” of it was at play. The use of the term “regulatory capture” is in essence 
the allegation that an agency initially formed to act in the public interest has instead 
begun to advance the commercial or political concerns of dominant special interest 
groups. This certainly does not lack aggression, but the power of the allegation is 
negated by the lack of any further explanation or reflection upon the underlying causes 
of such capture. The finding, unless carefully developed, could be challenged as 
impugning the motivations of senior management without accompanying findings of 
fact regarding the nature of motivations. Such a finding, in reviewing the execution of 
a legislative mandate, is also far more secure if made in the context of a section 8 
inquiry. 
In terms of the attribution of blame or statements of overarching managerial failure, the 
Committee generally elected to provide basic statements of corporate leadership: 
 “Bank failure…was the responsibility of senior executive management and the 
boards of directors”98 
“Government, including individual Ministers, made policy decisions…and 
ultimately accepted overall responsibility for decisions made”99 
The committee did not move to probe the source of these failings. Despite the scope 
offered by the Ardagh ruling, and the utility for future regulatory interventions of 
determining the role which internal leadership and individual agency played, the 
Committee eschewed any findings on individuals’ role in institutional failure. For 
instance the Report noted that while Financial Stability Reports did “identify key risks”, 
the overall assessment and tone of the reports were too reassuring and did not warn of 
systemic risks to the banking sector or structural imbalances in the economy.100 This 
system or policy finding is significant in the manner in which it identifies the particular 
approach to drafting which led to a failure to attend to the relevant risks. It does not 
however, reflect upon what caused the reports to be structured in such a manner (e.g 
lack of knowledge, overconfidence, or office culture). 
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Upon publication of the report, most media coverage was devoted to the relatively stern 
charges it levelled against the European Central Bank. The Committee found that letters 
from the ECB to Minister Brian Lenihan “threatened” that it would not continue to 
provide liquidity support for Irish banks were Ireland not to enter a bailout programme 
and that the withdrawal of support “was used as an explicit threat” to prevent the 
Government from imposing losses on senior bondholders in March 2011.101 These 
findings were not based upon revelations in Committee hearings, but rather upon access 
to four letters from Jean Claude Trichet, which had been already secured through the 
European Union ombudsman. This signature finding, could however be viewed as a 
matter of semantics. What the Committee presented as a “threat”, a charge carrying 
with it a tone of heavy handedness, was viewed by the ECB, as indicated by Mr Trichet, 
as simple “advice” on how an independent institution would apply its rules, including 
its responsibility to protect the Euro.102 Significantly, there was a further semantic drift 
in the introduction by the Chairman of the Committee, which held that “undue pressure” 
had been placed upon Ireland by the ECB.103 This phrase featured prominently in media 
coverage, despite not being a formal finding or even featuring in the main body of the 
Report. Arguably the testimony of Mr Trichet had contested the idea that any “undue” 
pressure was placed upon Ireland, meaning that the Chairman’s summary could be 
construed as ultra vires section 7 of the 2013 Act.104 
Despite the strictures of the inquire, record and report model, the development of 
recommendations for future reform represented a key opportunity for the Committee to 
apply an analytical lense. The future oriented elements of any parliamentary 
investigation provide an opportunity to escape the inevitable politicisation of past 
actions, which may fragment the unity of the Committee. If the Oireachtas is to argue 
persuasively, in the courts or to the public, that its investigatory powers are inevitably 
connected with effective legislative action, inquiry recommendations should be seen as 
a culmination of the entire process. In this context, the underdeveloped and subsidiary 
nature of many of the Committee’s recommendations cannot be attributed to legal 
restrictions.   
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The Final Report contained thirty one recommendations for reform in total. The chapter 
on the property sector produced one recommendation – namely that “a detailed and 
comprehensive property price register should be introduced’.105 Chapter 10 on “Ireland 
and the Troika Programme” went unaccompanied by any recommendation. Only one 
recommendation directly called for new legislation.106 The disconnect between the 
inquire, record and report model and legislative action is also underlined by the fact 
that a quarter of all recommendations call for further legislative reviews by third party 
actors. On the issue of inadequate parliamentary oversight, which the Committee was 
well placed to address, it proposed that: 
“The Public Service Oversight and Petitions Committee should review the most 
recent relevant reviews undertaken of the Irish parliamentary system and identify, 
along with an implementation plan, the key reforms necessary to improve 
accountability and oversight.”107 
This underlines the sense that the Committee did not, despite its evaluation of past 
failings and the role given it by its terms of reference, feel best placed to propose 
legislation. This crowding out of reform measures in the inquire, record and report 
process further underlines the case for its abandonment.   
While the Committee struggled to live up to the challenge to develop “a good and solid 
view on what to do to avoid something like this another time”,108 there was evidence 
of the added value which political ownership of an investigation can bring. This came 
in the recognition that: 
 “all the main political parties, whether in opposition or in government, advocated 
pro-cyclical fiscal policies, including increasing expenditure and reducing taxation, 
in the years leading up to the crisis”109 
The measure prescribed to interrupt this pattern of retail politics, was that an 
Independent Budgetary Office should be established, to provide costings of budgetary 
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and pre-election proposals of political parties and members of the Oireachtas. The Sub 
Committee on Dáil Reform has carried this recommendation forward and called for the 
Office to be fully operational by Spring 2017.110 This contrasts with institutional reform 
proposals made by Tribunals which remain outstanding.111 It must be noted however, 
that the Joint Committee itself prescribed no mechanism for follow up with its 
recommendations, and debate upon the report was conducted in the imminent shadow 
of the dissolution of the Oireachtas of which the Committee were agents. In such a 
context, drawing direct lines of causation between the report and future legislative 
action is a fraught exercise. 
Our analysis of the Banking Inquiry experience, does not support the idea that legal 
regulation is an insurmountable barrier to successful parliamentary inquiries. Greater 
efforts must be made to design inquiries which are deliverable, and focussed upon 
impact. The parliamentary inquiry, as an institution, must be clearly sited on the most 
solid ground: the review and introduction of potential legislation. Careful and unrushed 
drafting of final reports, which press the ambiguities at the core of the Ardagh ruling, 
seem key to ensuring that the identification of institutional flaws are accompanied by 
sufficient analysis of underlying causes. 
 
Conclusion 
The Joint Committee’s Report expressed its firm belief that “there is a clear place for, 
and value to be gained from, parliamentary inquiries into significant issues of public 
policy.”112 In this article we have attempted to reflect upon how such a place can most 
effectively be carved out. Rather than chasing the unlikely prospect of a second 
referendum, we argue the 2013 Act should be reformed, with the inquire, record and 
report model being abandoned. This move would underline the need for inquiries to be 
focussed upon regulatory appraisal alongside the development of reforms, and not 
merely the recording of narrative of least resistance.  
Legal interventions should not, however, be the main focus of reform efforts. In many 
respects, future developments must begin with a recognition that the two ‘hard cases’ 
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of Ardagh v Maguire and the Banking inquiry should not define the future of the 
mechanism. In particular, it is important that the Oireachtas understand the very specific 
context from which Ardagh arose, and the ambiguities which feature in that judgment. 
The prevailing dynamics support our broader thesis that Irish constitutional order 
should engage with greater depth with how government and the Oireachtas can 
proactively integrate constitutional values into their actions.  
The perceived burdens imposed by re Haughey or Ardagh can be counterbalanced by 
creating terms of reference which match the qualities of parliamentary investigation 
with appropriate subject matters. Yet in this crucial area, the inquiries landscape has 
suffered from vagueness and generality, most often produced by a lack of effective 
targeting or clearly stated yardsticks for evaluating conduct.  The former insufficiency 
relates to the breadth and scope of the inquiry – the banking inquiry underlines the 
importance of identifying the “value add” of an inquiry where earlier investigations 
have occurred. The latter insufficiency can be alleviated by a first principles 
consideration of the nature of the inquiry – what is the yardstick against which the 
events being discussed will be evaluated? – examples could include professional 
standards, political judgment, probity, economic soundness. While parliamentary 
inquiries are often rhetorically dismissed as “political witchhunts”, their legitimacy and 
efficacy is often obstructed by the under development of pre-existing standards of 
professional conduct or best practice principles regarding regulatory or political 
conduct. The impact of an underdeveloped administrative state on the functioning of 
inquiries was evident in the Interim Report of the Fennelly Commission of 
Investigation, where an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the resignation of the 
Garda Commissioner floundered due to the standard of record-keeping in government: 
“This Commission is, of course, powerless in the matter. It is left in the position of 
having to reconcile conflicting sworn evidence from responsible ministers and 
officials at the highest level in the State. It can only register its astonishment at a 
system of administration which apparently quite deliberately adopts a practice of not 
keeping any record of a meeting where an important decision is made.”113 
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Rather than viewing Oireachtas inquiries in isolation therefore, government must 
ensure that prevailing policy development and administrative processes are of a 
standard to not merely withstand, but actively facilitate, a later parliamentary inquiry. 
Finally, the interaction between Oireachtas inquiries and Commissions of Investigation 
should receive renewed examination. The reality that both these mechanisms represent 
only a partial response to an overall accountability challenge means that legal scholars 
should reflect upon the division of labour between them.  The differing expertise 
offered by the two institutions could be facilitated by structural reform: by creating a 
staged inquiry process. While mapping the detail of such an arrangement is beyond the 
scope of this article, we believe our analysis highlights its potential. Such an approach 
was supported by the UK Public Administration Select Committee in 2008, when it 
proposed the creation of parliamentary commissions of inquiry.114 In such a model, the 
parliamentary committee would facilitate and approve the creation of the inquiry’s 
terms of reference – with the core goal of fostering a political constituency to promote 
its effectiveness. The independent inquiry stage can then be targeted at forensic fact 
finding, fair process and the application of expertise. Upon the delivery of a final report, 
the parliamentary inquiry could then be tasked with holding hearings to ensure a public 
accounting. In addition, it would administer the recommendation or implementation 
stages, through its greater ability to explore the systemic issues, enhancing policy 
credibility and political buy in for reforms.  
The struggles faced by Oireachtas inquiries signal broader imbalances in Irish 
constitutionalism. There is a need to reflect on how to practically deliver the 
relationship of oversight and accountability immanent in the constitutional relationship 
between legislature and the executive. This underdevelopment is often reflective of the 
danger, identified by Bovens, that accountability, as an analytical concept of public law, 
often resembles “a garbage can filled with good intentions, loosely defined concepts 
and vague images of good governance”.115 The past experiences and efforts of 
Oireachtas committees, whether successful or not, provide key insight into the 
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approaches to design and targeting which can give the inevitably contextual and 
relational concept of accountability a fuller meaning. 
